

Sequence

(1a)

Arms race has always been dangerous. But it is becoming much More so w/ F.S. weapons. This is an outgrowth of an earlier period

People correctly perceive that the joint buildings pose a grave danger, particularly F.S. weapons.

The policies of our own country have shaped our predicament. One must start by recognizing that U.S. $\rightleftharpoons$ S.U. interaction has gone through 2 distinct phases

- a) no real race
- b) S.U. push to parity

→

INTERACTION : $US \rightleftharpoons SU$: is greatest threat

Sequence

(1b)

Q: ~~But~~ But isn't there some advantage in Soviets' building to parity? Doesn't that end the era of 1st use threats? They would be suicidal to carry out

A: ① It should, but it hasn't:

≡
≡
≡

Here is the pattern of f.u. threats.

(Cuba - caribbean - now)

② IF we ask what it takes to get us to make a threat...

- Surrounded
- Stalemate
- Not making S.U. willing to

Detering Soviets from ground combat which could get out of control → ~~escalate~~ escalation → ~~preemption~~ preemption

up the ante in a crisis / discouraging direct intervention

It is not only the U.S. who might make such threats. U.S. leaders have for years given to other countries the example of F.U. threat

Other countries' leaders: not more willing than us, or crazier than us. They need only be like our Presidents. (Applies to S.U.)

We are going to move in w/ troops. Don't fight us, or we'll initiate nuc weapons use. Then 1 of us might escalate or preempt. Even you might preempt to preempt our use. ∴ - don't engage your troops w/ ours. We're determined to put ours in, but you should back off. (Example: 73) Yom Kippur War
- Cuba
- Berlin

②
Q: Why, then, has U.S. been the one to make nuc. threats?

① We were far ahead

② Even after parity gained and risks increased, we've continued to make them..... Reason: defend far-flung empire.

The S.U. also is an imperial power, but their empire is more compact.

Q: ~~Is it~~ ^{Is it} the Soviet nuclear capability a threat to the world?

Yes—particularly the interaction of U.S. & S.U. capabilities
—Types of weapons

There is no external threat to our security that is ~~as~~ remotely comparable to the risk of nuc. war posed by the interaction of U.S. & S.U. capabilities.

We have no interests that can be advanced by a nuc war. No threat we might ever face is remotely comparable to nuc war danger.

The policies of U.S. govt most need changing if the nuc era is to be made less dangerous. It is fortunate, because our policies are susceptible to change.

I talk about what's wrong w/our policy because it is what we most can change.

We are the driving force. But we aren't the only problem.

We can best understand our part of nuc problem by looking at 1st half of nuc era. We were racing alone.

Our motives can most clearly be seen in that 1st phase, when we weren't reacting to Soviets. Interests & propensities which then still operate today — intertwined and obscured by interaction w/Soviet actions.

Common explanation that we've responded to S.U. — fallacy of this can most clearly be seen then

④

- Strategic bombing
- 1st phase of postwar era (widely misunderstood by public; needs to be understood). We need to understand the roots of U.S. policy if we are to change it constructively.
- There is a widespread belief that we've been ready to Soviet initiatives or imminent S. U. superiority. This never been true; is not true today [parity is true]. And is completely divorced from reality in 1st 20 years.
- Correct wrong public impression.

After Berlin; Cuba:
2nd phase: Soviets go for parity.

In '58, '48 - Superpower

In '61 - less than it had been, and Kennedy was less willing to carry out threat. But he was making a threat, similar to what was made in '73. He acted as though parity was already existing.

S.U. - had an equalizing factor in their IRBM's aimed at Europe.

The threat of instability

'61 - Berlin

'62 - Cuba

'73 - Egypt

Carter & Reagan Doctrine

During Eisenhower era: no direct threat w/ S.U.

Berlin: '48. They had zero. We had almost zero, but we were bluffing.

S.U. had not attained parity by '58-'60. They had something in between. Enormous ^(U.S.) vs. Something ^(S.U.)

As early as '61, some phenomena of parity were beginning to appear. Berlin, Cuba - S.U. was acting more like an equal.

'73 defines a pre-existing category: a threat of instability - things going out of control. If S.U. doesn't back off:

Instability: the only kind of threat we can make now against S.U. Credible threat: nucs would be used in desperation, ... because alternative appears worse.

Since '65 - only plausible that you'll ~~escalate~~ ^{use} long-range weapons if you have reason to believe you are preempting.

In 61-62 - no preemptive incentive but due to our superiority, we didn't need it. We'd have one (though at great cost). Only credible if the alternative would have been an unacceptably great defeat.

Belief: if we lost Cuba, we'd lose Berlin. (Undercut us w/ Allies)

Does S.U. really want to run the world? Or do they want to dominate w/in its own borders, & have a world influence comparable to ours? (e.g. France in Africa; France? England in Latin Am.) (We don't want another great power.)

when: ~~thinking~~?

✓ ① 1st phase of arms race up to 2d

② 2nd " " " "

✓ ③ IS this end of f.u. threats?

✓ - No - show pattern. It's likely to continue

④ ~~Since these are the circumstances for f.u. th~~

✓ ④ why are threats continuing?

✓ why has U.S. relied more on F.U. threats than Soviets? (particularly during last 20 yrs of party)

✓ - Comparison of spheres

✓ ⑤ ~~A great~~ ~~their~~ nuc policies of S.U. a risk to the world?

⑥ - Yes - especially presently as we embark on 3rd phase of arms race: F.S.

⑦ Even earlier: their ^{2d phase} imitation was imprudent. We can't rely on Soviet wisdom or prudence to save us.

And now their imprudence is leading them to join 3rd phase of arms race: F.S. weapons — very dangerous. (LL, USSR pieces — draw on)

✓ ⑧ Analysis of instability.

⑨ we are prolonging arms race and increasing instability in order to

SA
Priorities

SC ✓
2nd set
more
dangerous

maintain ability to make threats.

- ✓ ⑧ S.U. is less committed to ~~continue~~ arms race — it's not their highest priority to end it, but they are more willing than U.S. govt to end it.

- ✓ ⑨ Program: change U.S. govt to being willing to test Soviet willingness to end arms race.

- ✗ ⑩ What should we be aiming for? What long range objectives?
+ NFU, oppose intervention, etc.

- ⑪ What should we do immediately:
— get Democratic candidate to commit to ~~freeze~~ as much of earlier program as possible
— Congress: take initiative for Quick Freeze, oppose intervention, and NFU.

- ⑫ How can we work to achieve these objectives?
— Lobbying, education, electoral politics, ^{N-V} _{div-} action

Face-to-face contact w/insiders?

✓ R.D. challenge on face-to-face
LLL, inside vs. outsiders,
building other institutions (e.g. Satyagraha
campaign) — ~~is~~^{i.e.} a Movement.

→ ✓ Gandhian aspect important

✓ Jani Ke^(sp.) story

✓ Gandhi

✓ Rocky Flats

✓ ~~action~~
MX

On → inner?

Deal

OTHER POINTS

I don't just do c.D.

- lobbying, letters, do it all
talk to family

Inside: "You were an insider."

- Tell story of ~~his~~ father.